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The Implementation of FDA Determinations in 
Litigation: Why Do We Defer to the PTO but Not 
to the FDA? * 
William G. Childs** 
 
In early 1987, a scientist working in the research laborato-
ries of MegaPharma Co., a pharmaceutical company, discov-
ered a molecule that she believed would be an effective treat-
ment for depression.  Early preclinical work was promising.  
Therefore, her company’s patent lawyers filed an application in 
her name in late 1987 for a patent to be assigned to the com-
pany. 
The prosecution of the patent lasted for twenty-one 
months, and the prosecution history came to fill close to half a 
banker’s box.  The patent examiner focused on three pieces of 
prior art that he initially suggested might render the claimed 
invention obvious.  After correspondence was exchanged on this 
topic of obviousness, the examiner became convinced that the 
molecule was, in fact, a patentable invention – that it was use-
ful, new, obvious, and enabled.1  The patent issued in 1989.  
The patent prosecution process, excluding the actual discovery 
of the molecule, took approximately eighty hours of work by the 
inventor and MegaPharma’s inside patent counsel, and about 
twenty hours by the patent examiner. 
Meanwhile, MegaPharma decided the molecule, a member 
of the class of drugs known as selective serotonin reuptake in-
                                                          
* This article is published online at http://mipr.umn.edu. 
** Assistant Professor (as of August 2004), Western New England College 
School of Law.  Thanks to Mark Lemley and David Anderson for their com-
ments on drafts, and to audiences at the Western New England College School 
of Law, the University of Cincinnati College of Law, the University of South 
Carolina School of Law, and the Northern Illinois University College of Law.  
Thanks also to the editors at the Minnesota Intellectual Property Review for 
their thoughtful comments and editing.  Errors naturally remain mine.  I ac-
knowledge the support of Williams & Connolly LLP in preparing this article.  
This article does not necessarily reflect the views of either Williams & Con-
nolly or its clients.  I am grateful to Dena, Ella, and Liam Childs for their sup-
port and patience. 
1 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 102 (novelty), 103 (non-obviousness), & 112 
(enablement) (2000); see generally Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
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hibitors (“SSRIs”), had the potential to make a splash in the 
multi-billion dollar market for safe and effective treatments for 
depression.  Though there were several other SSRIs already on 
the market, MegaPharma’s marketing department concluded 
that the drug would fit into a small but profitable niche, serv-
ing as the “cost-effective SSRI”.  Accordingly, the company’s 
management approved the drug’s development. 
The preclinical work began in early 1988, and consisted of 
standard in vitro and in vivo studies considering toxicity, ab-
sorption, metabolism, and excretion.2  These early studies pro-
vided a foundation of information from which later trials would 
be developed.  The company decided, based on these early re-
sults, to file an Investigational New Drug application (“IND”).3  
The IND provides the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
with a pharmacological profile of the drug, results of acute toxi-
cology studies in at least two species of animals, and the results 
of short-term toxicity studies.4  The FDA did not oppose the 
IND within thirty days, and it was thus approved in early 
1991.5 
The first Phase I and Phase II clinical trials began shortly 
thereafter.  Phase I trials, with twenty to eighty healthy volun-
teers, are used to evaluate safety, to further determine a dos-
age range, and to identify side effects.6  Phase II trials, com-
mencing somewhat later, include between one and three 
hundred participants, and help determine the medicine’s effi-
cacy and provide further data on its safety.7 
The data from these Phase I and II trials raised no signifi-
cant concerns with respect to the medicine’s safety profile, 
though they confirmed that, as with other SSRIs, the medicine 
seemed to cause headaches and tremor.  The data also indi-
cated an efficacy profile similar to other SSRIs.  Thus, with 
preclinical data and data from the Phase I and II clinical trials, 
                                                          
2 See FDA, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-3.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 
2003). 
3 See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Frequently Asked Questions 
on Drug Development and Investigational New Drug Applications, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/smallbiz/faq.htm (last visited June 2, 2003). 
4 See id. 
5 See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, supra note 3. 
6 See National Library of Medicine, ClinicalTrials.gov, Linking Patients to 
Medical Research, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct/info/whatis (last visited 
June 2, 2003). 
7 See id. 
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MegaPharma’s scientists were approved to go forward with 
Phase III trials.  Phase III trials involve much larger popula-
tions, one to three thousand volunteers, and research further 
the drug’s safety and efficacy.8 
At this point, the drug was named Phelox for marketing 
purposes. It was ultimately tested in eight thousand patients, a 
number comparable to other SSRI clinical trials.  As with the 
Phase I and Phase II trials, no significant issues were identi-
fied from a safety perspective; and Phelox appeared to be com-
parable to other SSRIs in its efficacy.  Based on thesedata, 
MegaPharma filed a New Drug Application (“NDA”), seeking 
the FDA’s permission to market Phelox for the treatment of 
depression. 
Phase III trials indicated that a slightly higher percentage 
of people taking Phelox experienced tremor than those taking 
placebo or comparator SSRIs. However, this difference was not 
statistically significant.  Neither MegaPharma nor the FDA 
considered the difference to be of importance and, after eight 
years of preclinical and clinical trials, Phelox was approved for 
marketing in 1999. Phelox’s label, as agreed upon with the 
FDA, contained a warning regarding tremor as a side effect of 
the class of SSRIs, including Phelox.  However, the labeling did 
not indicate, nor did MegaPharma believe, that it occurred any 
more often with Phelox than with other SSRIs. 
The preclinical and clinical research involved thousands of 
hours of work by MegaPharma employees. Furthermore, hun-
dreds of hours of work by a team of FDA scientists and doctors 
were required for FDA approval.  In the end, Megapharma 
spent almost $500 million in development costs. 
MegaPharma launched an aggressive marketing campaign 
in support of Phelox, emphasizing its low cost and its appropri-
ateness for patients without insurance.  The marketing efforts 
included a substantial direct-to-consumer component, including 
television advertisements urging patients to seek treatment for 
depression and trumpeting Phelox’s relatively low price.  Its ef-
forts paid off quickly, as the medicine rapidly achieved a five 
percent market share that continued to grow consistently. 
MegaPharma’s success received the attention of a small 
generic drug company, GenerDrugs.  In early 2003, Gener-
Drugs decided that the three pieces of prior art considered im-
portant by the patent examiner rendered Phelox obvious.  Con-
                                                          
8 See id. 
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sequently, it submitted an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(“ANDA”), as provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act.9  As part of 
this ANDA, GenerDrugs included what is known as a “Para-
graph IV” certification that the brand name company (i.e., 
MegaPharma) held no valid patents that were infringed by the 
proposed generic equivalent of Phelox.10  MegaPharma 
promptly filed suit against GenerDrugs for patent infringe-
ment. 
At the same time that the generic drug company decided it 
was interested in Phelox, so, too, did a group of Mississippi 
plaintiffs’ lawyers who specialized in lawsuits against pharma-
ceutical companies.  An article published in a peer-reviewed 
medical journal noted that an HMO had examined its mem-
bers’ data on various SSRIs.  The efficacy data for Phelox was 
comparable to those for other SSRIs.  However, the lawyers no-
ticed in the adverse event data that substantially more Phelox 
patients complained of tremor than patients taking other 
SSRIs. At the same time, an article was published in a second 
medical journal that provided theoretical support for a link be-
tween SSRIs and Parkinson’s disease, noting in particular that 
tremor is a possible early warning sign of Parkinson’s. 
                                                          
9 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b-68c, 70b 
(1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994)) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. 
10 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides for this approach when a generic company 
believes that a patent involving a brand-name drug is either not infringed by 
the generic or not valid. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2000).  The Para-
graph IV certification puts the brand-name company on notice of the generic 
drug company’s intent to make a bioequivalent drug, and creates federal ju-
risdiction for a lawsuit against the generic manufacturer.  See id.  If the 
brand-name company files suit within forty-five days, the FDA approval is 
stayed for thirty months.  See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  At the end of the process, if 
the generic drug manufacturer obtains the right to market the drug, it will 
have a 180-day exclusivity period. See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
Despite the fact that most patent infringement suits carry a jury right, there 
is no established right to a jury trial when suit is brought under the Hatch-
Waxman Act.  See Brian D. Coggio & Sandra A. Bresnick, The Right to a Jury 
Trial in Actions Under the Waxman-Hatch Act, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 259, 275 
(1997).  It is not clear whether a judge could permit a jury trial if requested by 
the parties.  It is also not clear whether the lack of a jury right would be up-
held if constitutionally challenged.  Thus, the hypothetical is in some sense 
fictional as it would be extremely uncommon for a generic drug dispute to be 
tried before a jury.  The presumption of validity certainly still applies when 
the issue is tried to a judge.  This minor fiction is not particularly important, 
as most patent litigation remains in front of juries, and the hypothetical pro-
vides a useful way to compare directly the value of the agency actions in ques-
tion. 
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The Mississippi lawyers moved into action, rapidly signing 
up plaintiffs through television and newspaper ads suggesting 
that Phelox patients “may be at an increased risk of Parkin-
son’s disease – and MegaPharma should pay.”  Hundreds of 
plaintiffs, some with Parkinson’s and many without, signed up 
within weeks, and the first lawsuit was filed two weeks after 
the articles appeared. 
MegaPharma thus faced a situation where it had what can 
colloquially be referred to as two government licenses, one to 
exclude others from using its molecule and one to sell the medi-
cine containing that molecule as “safe and effective.”  It also 
faced two close-call cases, where its attorneys advised that the 
odds were roughly even that a jury would find either its patent 
invalid or its drug to be unsafe.  What do these licenses get 
MegaPharma? 
Its patent gets MegaPharma a presumption of validity, 
such that the accused infringer must prove invalidity by clear 
and convincing evidence.11  The accused infringer can also 
prove the patent unenforceable if it can show inequitable con-
duct, once again by clear and convincing evidence.12  On the 
other hand, in the tort litigation, MegaPharma gets an oppor-
tunity to tell the jury about the FDA’s approval.  However, 
Megapharma gets no presumption, no increased burden of 
proof, nor an instruction that FDA approval should be consid-
ered as relevant in determining design, marketing defect, or 
assessing punitive damages. 
This article examines the possible inequity of the treat-
ment of licensees’ rights in tort litigation in comparison to pat-
ent rights in patent litigation.  In particular, this article pre-
sents the presumptions afforded from issued patents as a valid 
model for the proper treatment of FDA approval in litigation.  
Presently, most academic discussion proposes either preclusion 
of tort claims or leaving the system more or less as it stands.  
This article, on the other hand, proposes a middle ground. 
This article begins by examining the differences between 
the USPTO and the FDA.  In particular, the quantity and qual-
ity of the review provided by each agency is explored along with 
the purposes of that review.  The article then turns to a more 
complete examination of how a patent or FDA approval is 
                                                          
11 See, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see also, e.g., Neff Instrument Corp. v. Cohu 
Elecs., Inc., 298 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1961). 
12 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 
1113, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
CHILDS FORMATTED FINAL 05/12/2004  12:49 PM 
160 MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 5:2 
 
treated in litigation, both in principle and in practice.  The ad-
vantages to the patent-holder include evidentiary presumptions 
as well as instructions from the judge regarding those pre-
sumptions. 
With the factual scenario and the differences in treatment 
established, this article next looks to why the treatments of the 
agency determinations in question differ in these contexts.  
Presently, the patent holder is positioned to benefit from 
USPTO mistakes (i.e., an erroneous grant of a patent) more 
than the manufacturer of an FDA-approved medicine will bene-
fit from an FDA mistake (i.e., approval of an unsafe or ineffec-
tive drug).  In other words, in a comparably close case (as the 
hypothetical case above is intended to represent), a patent 
holder will win while a holder of an FDA approval will lose. 
A determination of whether this difference in advantages 
is appropriate can be made only through examination of the in-
terests at issue.  As an initial matter, this article examines 
government interests including ensuring that determinations 
made by the USPTO or FDA are accurate and implemented 
appropriately.  Also examined are the individual and societal 
interests furthered by patent litigation and product liability 
litigation. In patent litigation, courts seek to protect proper 
patent monopolies while preventing improper ones (i.e., those 
based on invalid or unenforceable patents).  In the pharmaceu-
tical context, courts seek to protect citizens from unsafe drugs 
while avoiding imposing unwarranted liability on drug produc-
ers.  Whether these interests are, or are not, furthered through 
a variety of procedural mechanisms is a critical matter when 
determining if those mechanisms are appropriate. 
After exploring the USPTO and FDA in comparison to each 
other, this article lays out the present posture of the debate on 
how to treat FDA approval in litigation.  The bulk of discussion 
can be categorized into two areas: one urging preclusion of tort 
liability if the defendant complied with relevant regulatory re-
quirements and another opposing such preclusion and leaving 
the system as it stands, with some incremental institutional 
changes. 
Concluding remarks demonstrate that a juxtaposition of 
the USPTO and FDA processes indicates that FDA approval 
should receive at minimum the deference in litigation that an 
issued patent receives. Therefore, this article proposes a pre-
sumption of safety and efficacy for FDA-approved drugs.  With 
the outlines of the proposed presumption established, the arti-
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cle further considers the presumption in the context of the con-
cerns raised by the various commentators in the regulatory 
compliance defense debate. Finally, the article concludes that a 
presumption from FDA licensing addresses these concerns bet-
ter than the proposals made by commentators to date.13 
I. HOW PATENTS ARE GRANTED (OR AREN’T) AND HOW 
FDA APPROVALS ARE GRANTED (OR AREN’T) 
A. PATENT ISSUANCE 
By its own terms, “[t]he role of the USPTO is to grant pat-
ents for the protection of inventions.”14  In 2001, 345,732 appli-
cations were received by the USPTO and 183,975 patents were 
granted.15  At the same time, the USPTO has roughly 3,500 
patent examiners.16 Thus, each examiner reviews roughly 50 
patents per year, or one patent per week. 
The patent process begins, unsurprisingly, with a patent 
application.17  This document, typically 50 to 100 pages long, 
                                                          
13 Although it is not central to this article, the argument presented would 
support a conclusion that the treatment of the respective agencies’ decisions 
should in fact be reversed; the presumption of validity should be eliminated 
while a presumption of safety and efficacy should be implemented.  The impli-
cations of this article in the patent context will have to be fully explored an-
other day, though they are referenced in part below. 
14 United States Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concern-
ing Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html (last 
visited June 4, 2003) [hereinafter General Information]. 
15 United States Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent Statistics, Calen-
dar Years 1963-2001, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/ 
us_stat.pdf (last visited June 4, 2003) [hereinafter Patent Statistics].  The 
length of the application process presently averages 24 months.  See United 
States Patent and Trademark Office, Performance and Accountability Report 
for Fiscal year 2002, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2002/1-
58.pdf (last visited June 4, 2003) [hereinafter Performance and Accountability 
Report].  Because of this lengthy application process, these numbers are not 
directly comparable.  In 1999, when many of the 2001-issued patents were 
likely applied for, 288,811 applications were received.  See Patent Statistics, 
supra note 15.  The USPTO states that approximately two of three patent ap-
plications result in an issued patent.  See General Information, supra note 14.  
This proportion significantly overstates the rejection rate due to the unique 
role of continuations and continuations-in-part in the U.S. patent system.  See 
generally Cecil D. Quillen & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applica-
tions and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 1, 9-13 (2001) (concluding that the true “grant rate” is roughly 85 percent 
and the true “allowance rate” is 92 percent). 
16 See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 9. 
17 See General Information, supra note 14. 
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includes a variety of administrative materials and a substan-
tive portion that usually includes the patent’s proposed title, 
cross-referenced patents and patent applications, other rele-
vant references, the invention’s background, a summary of the 
invention, the specification, the claims of the patent, and draw-
ings when appropriate.18  The application’s purpose is to pro-
vide the examiner, and later the public, with a clear delineation 
of the claimed invention.19 
Nearly all proceedings before the USPTO are ex parte.20  
Therefore, except in limited circumstances, there is no advocate 
for those parties who assert that a patent is invalid.  Indeed, 
for the first eighteen months, the application is itself secret.21  
During examination of an application, the applicant must dis-
close known relevant prior art, and the examiner does research 
for additional prior art.22  Although the applicant and examiner 
are allowed to present arguments to one another, the adversar-
ial system with which most litigants are familiar is almost en-
tirely absent. 
Once the application is received, it is assigned to a patent 
examiner.23  The examiners are divided into a variety of spe-
cialties and subspecialties.24  While the precise qualifications 
vary by field, in general, patent examiners are required to have 
an undergraduate degree in a relevant field.25  Additional ongo-
ing training is provided as well.26  The turnover in the ranks of 
patent examiners is an ongoing concern for the USPTO.27  In 
recent years, it has been viewed as a victory for attrition to be 
down to seven percent annually.28 
                                                          
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
20 See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1379 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting in part). 
21 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000).  Applications filed only in the United States 
and submitted prior to November 29, 2000, are permanently secret. See id. 
22 See General Information, supra note 14. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Examiner Recruitment, 
Qualifications, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/ohr/jobs/ 
qualifications.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004). 
26 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Examiner Recruitment, 
Training, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/ohr/jobs/training.htm 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004). 
27 Cf. Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 22 (describing 
improvements in attrition numbers). 
28 See id. 
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The initial review of the application results in the first of-
fice action.29  The time between submission and the first office 
action is carefully tracked by the USPTO as part of its efforts to 
improve its efficiency.30  At last report, this time period aver-
ages 16.7 months.31  The first office action can be a grant of the 
patent or a rejection based on any of the conditions for pat-
entability.32  If the patent is rejected, the applicant will have an 
opportunity to respond by either amending claims or making 
arguments as to why the examiner’s position is incorrect.33  
Even if the claim language is not amended, the statements 
made in this process, called the prosecution history, can limit 
how the patent is eventually construed.34  In a complex patent 
application, the prosecution history may consist of several 
boxes, while in a more straightforward application, it may con-
sist of just a folder. 
After the response to the first office action, the patent ex-
aminer responds with either approval of the patent application 
or further rejections.35  These rejections are often called “final 
rejections,” reflecting the fact that the applicant does not have 
an absolute right to respond.36  In practice, the applicant will 
usually be given an opportunity to respond and make further 
arguments or amendments.37  This back-and-forth communica-
tion between examiner and applicant can continue over months 
or even years until either the applicant abandons the applica-
tion or it is granted.38  The average duration from application 
to issuance or abandonment is approximately two to three 
years, but the actual time spent by either the applicant, coun-
sel, or examiner is nowhere near that lengthy.39  A conservative 
estimate of the total average time spent in the active prosecu-
tion of a patent is between fifty to one hundred hours of work 
by the prosecuting attorney, and around twenty hours by the 
                                                          
29 See General Information, supra note 14. 
30 See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 15. 
31 See id. 
32 See General Information, supra note 14. 
33 See id. 
34 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kyogo Kabushiki, 535 U.S. 722, 
727 (2002). 
35 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 - 1.114 (2000); General Information, supra note 14. 
36 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.113; General Information, supra note 14. 
37 See General Information, supra note 14. 
38 See id. 
39 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1500 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance]. 
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patent examiner.40 
While many examiners are experienced and highly compe-
tent, criticism of the patent application process is widespread.41  
Commentators argue that examiners have insufficient exper-
tise to accurately determine if an application represents an ad-
vance over the prior art.42  As noted, a patent examiner is re-
quired only to have an undergraduate degree in a relevant 
field,43 whereas many patent applications realistically require 
more specialized knowledge.44 
A second criticism of the USPTO is that patents are inap-
propriately issued, resulting in virtually any application’s ac-
ceptance provided the inventor is sufficiently persistent.45  In-
deed, the USPTO’s mission is to grant patents.46  A prime 
criticism in recent years has been focused on “business meth-
ods” patents, embodied by the Amazon.com patent on “one-
click” shopping.47  Some commentators criticize the conceptual 
basis for patenting business methods, while others simply be-
lieve that a substantial number of those patents are invalid 
and should never have been granted.48 
Perhaps the strongest criticism targets jury verdicts in-
validating patents.  According to one study of infringement 
cases decided in 2001, around fifty to sixty jury verdicts in-
cluded the invalidation of a patent, or a finding that a patent 
was unenforceable.49  Similar studies have found that half of 
patents litigated are found invalid by juries.50  Presumably a 
                                                          
40 See id. at 1499-1500. 
41 See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39 (arguing that improv-
ing the Patent Office examination process is not cost-effective, preferring a 
more searching inquiry into patents’ validity by the courts); see also James 
Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44. 
42 See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1495-96 n.2 (noting 
the USPTO’s failure to “hire examiners skilled in the software arts or to allow 
software engineers to practice before it, and failing to classify software prior 
art well”). 
43 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
44 See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1495-96 n.2. 
45 See id. at 1523-24. 
46 See id. 
47 U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411, http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=/netahtml/srchnum.h
tm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=5,960,411.WKU.&OS=PN/5,960,411&RS=PN/5,960,4
11 (last visited February 13, 2004); see also generally Gleick, supra note 41. 
48 See Gleick, supra note 41. 
49See University of Houston Law Center, Decisions for 2001, 
http://www.patstats.org/2001.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2003). 
50 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity 
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significant number of infringement claims are never asserted, 
or if asserted, relatively small settlements are reached. 51 
Notwithstanding the criticism, some consider the United 
States’ patent system a key factor in U.S. innovation, outweigh-
ing its possible deficiencies.52  If successful, the applicant re-
ceives a patent representing the government’s conclusion that 
the invention described in the application is both worthy of pro-
tection and of a temporary monopoly.  To put it in the context 
of the Phelox hypothetical, based on a half-week of considera-
tion by the examiner, MegaPharma will get a lengthy monopoly 
on its product, and, as discussed infra,53 a presumption in any 
subsequent litigation that the monopoly is appropriate. 
B. FDA APPROVAL 
The process of putting a drug through the development and 
approval process is a lengthy and expensive one.  Recent stud-
ies indicate that the average cost of developing a drug is 
roughly $800 million.54  Seventeen new drugs were approved by 
the FDA in 2002, and the average period from application to 
approval was 17.8 months.55  To handle the INDs and NDAs it 
receives each year, the FDA employs hundreds of reviewers in 
various fields.56  The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(“CDER”) describes its job as “ensuring that drugs are safe and 
                                                                                                                            
of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 206-7 (1998). 
51 The USPTO itself has concluded that, between 1999 and 2002, from 4.2% to 
6.6% of issued patents have at least one claim that would be held invalid if 
considered by a court.  See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 
15, at 18. 
52 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-1000 (1997) (describing the commonly assumed 
idea that the patent system encourages innovation); cf. Mark A. Lemley, 
Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 137 (2000) (noting studies challenging the innovation story while giv-
ing the notion due accord). 
53 See infra section II. 
54 See PhRMA, Most Drugs Never Recoup the Average Cost of Development, 
http://www.phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/16.04.2003.717.cfm (Mar. 26, 
2003) [hereinafter PhRMA].  PhRMA is an industry advocacy group that may 
be interested in emphasizing the high costs of drug development. 
55 See PhRMA, New Drug Approvals in 2002, 1, 
http://www.phrma.org/newmedicines/resources/2003-01-30.102.pdf (last vis-
ited August 11, 2003) [hereinafter PhRMA, New Drug Approvals in 2002]. 
56 “[The] CDER is the largest of the FDA’s five centers, with a staff of about 
1,800.”  Tamara Nordenberg, Inside FDA: The Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, FDA CONSUMER MAG., July-Aug. 1996, 
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/696cder.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2003). 
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effective.”57 
Some sources list the average time from discovery through 
approval as ten to fifteen years.58  The process of discovery 
through filing an IND could take an average of six to seven 
years, followed by another six to seven years of clinical trials, 
with a further eighteen months prior to approval by the FDA.59  
Given five thousand compounds that reach preclinical studies, 
only five are tested in humans, and of those five, one eventually 
obtains approval by the FDA.60 
NDAs are themselves extraordinary documents.  An NDA 
typically runs over 100,000 pages.61  It contains all data from 
the sponsor’s study of the drug in preclinical and clinical trials, 
along with the sponsor’s interpretation of these data.62  It 
represents the results of thousands of hours of work and mil-
lions of dollars.63 
The FDA review process includes reviewers from a number 
of disciplines working in tandem.  Statisticians, chemists, 
pharmacologists, physicians, pharmacokineticists, and, when 
appropriate, microbiologists, are all involved in reviewing the 
data provided by the drug’s sponsor.64 
The NDA process is essentially ex parte, although there 
can be more public information available concerning the appli-
cation status than can be found in the patent context.65  Re-
quests for additional testing, rejections, grants, and review 
panels66 are all public activities, and an NDA filing is fre-
quently announced by the sponsor in press releases.67  While 
the application process occasionally enters the public domain, it 
                                                          
57 See id. 
58 See PhRMA, New Drug Approvals in 2002, supra note 55, at 17. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. 
64 See FDA, Benefit vs. Risk: How CDER Approves New Drugs, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/whatwedo/testtube-5.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 
2003) [hereinafter FDA, Benefits vs. Risk]. 
65 See, e.g., Press Release, AstraZeneca, AstraZeneca Submits its New Super-
statin, CRESTOR™, for Regulatory Approval in the US and Europe.  Devel-
opment of VIOZAN™ COPD Treatment to be Discontinued; Resources to be Re-
allocated to More Promising Products in R&D Pipeline, 
http://www.astrazeneca.com/ pressrelease/393.aspx (June 27, 2001); see also 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1499. 
66 See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. 
67 See, e.g., Press Release, AstraZeneca, supra note 65. 
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remains fundamentally non-adversarial.68  The data are re-
viewed and reviewers provide recommendations as to whether 
the product should be approved.69  Based on these recommen-
dations and further study of the underlying data, the FDA 
chooses to approve the drug, reject the application, or request 
additional information.70 
The review process, while subject to criticism71, is not gen-
erally considered a rubber stamp.  Recent high-profile rejec-
tions72 and demands for additional data73 demonstrate that the 
FDA will not approve all applications.  The FDA also regularly 
appoints a review panel, made up of neutral third-party physi-
cians, scientists, and others to examine the data from a special-
ist’s point of view.74 
This process is time and labor intensive.  Recall that the 
time from NDA submission to approval averages about twenty 
months.75  These twenty months are not spent waiting for re-
sponses, but rather spent analyzing and reviewing the submit-
ted NDA, and participating in discussions between the FDA 
and the sponsor.76  The time from the IND to the NDA averages 
seven years, and the time from discovery to the IND averages 
six and a half years.77 
                                                          
68 See FDA, Benefits vs. Risk, supra note 64. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
72 The Imclone cancer drug Erbitux’s rejection by the FDA in 2001 was subject 
to great press interest.  The Erbitux application was recently resubmitted to 
the FDA.  See Matthew Herper, Puncturing the ImClone Hype, 
http://www.forbes.com/technology/2003/06/02/cx_mh_0602imclone.html (June 
6, 2003). 
73 Crestor, a member of the class of anti-cholesterol medications known as 
statins, was ultimately approved with a lower dosage range than proposed by 
its sponsor AstraZeneca.  See FDA Advisory Committee Meeting Briefing 
Document NDA 21-366 for the use of CRESTOR, 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/3968B1_02_A-FDA-
Clinical%20Review.pdf (June 11, 2003); FDA Talk Paper, U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration, FDA Approves New Drug for Lowering Cholesterol, T03-61, 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS01247.html (Aug. 12, 
2003). 
74 Indeed, the approval of Crestor occurred only after such a meeting.  See 
FDA Advisory Committee Meeting, supra note 73. 
75 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
76  See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1500. 
77 See John T. Kelly, The Drug Development and Approval Process, New Drug 
Approvals in 2002, 17, http://www.phrma.org/newmedicines/resources/2003-
01-30.102.pdf; see also PhRMA, New Drug Approvals in 2002, supra note 55, 
at 17. 
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An important part of the evaluation by the FDA is the de-
termination of what information goes into a drug’s package in-
sert.78  FDA approval of a drug does not allow the manufac-
turer to market it however it sees fit or for any use it wishes to 
pitch.  Instead, the approval carries with it an important 
phrase: “adequate information has been presented to demon-
strate that the drug product is safe and effective for use as rec-
ommended in the agreed upon labeling text.”79 Marketing out-
side the label results in the drug being misbranded.80  
However, with respect to use and marketing within the label, 
the approval denotes that the drug is safe and effective.81 
Unlike the patent process,82 the FDA involvement in a 
drug does not end with its approval.83  The FDA has a perpet-
ual, extensive monitoring process and ongoing authority over 
the drug sponsors to require additional information, testing, or 
actions, from label changes up to and including involuntary 
product withdrawal or recall.84  Every time the drug company 
wishes to change the package insert in order to add an indica-
tion, a warning, or a dose, the FDA must decide once again 
whether the product is indeed safe and effective by considering 
the data from the clinical trials as well as information from 
post-marketing reports.85 
After a drug company begins marketing a drug, it remains 
responsible for reporting to the FDA any adverse events it 
learns of on a specific schedule.86  Reporting to either the FDA 
                                                          
78 See Letter from Center for Drug Evaluation and Research to Parke-Davis 
Pharmaceutical Research, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/appletter/1998/20702ltrs003s005.pdf (Jul. 10, 
1998) (FDA letter approving Lipitor). 
79 Id. 
80 See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2000); Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
81 See, e.g., Letter from David G. Orloff, Director, Division of Metabolic and 
Endocrine Drug Products, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, to Chris-
topher Graham, Director, Worldwide Regulatory Strategy, Pfizer, Inc., 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/appletter/2002/20702se5-033ltr.pdf (Oct. 18, 2002) 
(2002 FDA letter approving a label change for Lipitor, including “safe and ef-
fective” finding). 
82 In very rare circumstances, the USPTO will reconsider previously issued 
patents.  See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 106 
(noting that in 2002, 272 requests for reexamination were received, of which 
200 were granted). 
83 See Nordenberg, supra note 56. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
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or the drug company by healthcare providers or others is en-
tirely voluntary.87  These adverse event reports are not consid-
ered to be a reliable basis for determining causation or inci-
dence rate.88  However, they can be valuable in generating 
hypotheses or signals of potential safety issues, and drug com-
panies and the FDA monitor them closely.89  The FDA also oc-
casionally performs audits of pharmaceutical companies’ drug 
safety departments, evaluating whether the processes are in 
place for appropriate handling of the event reports and whether 
those processes are followed correctly.90 
Like the USPTO, critics argue that the FDA’s review and 
ongoing monitoring process is inadequate.91  The approval 
process is based almost entirely on self-reporting by the phar-
maceutical companies.92  These companies have an apparent 
interest other than full disclosure.93  The FDA does not perform 
its own trials, and clinical trials are performed by physicians 
who are paid by the pharmaceutical companies themselves.94  
Critics also charge that the FDA is more focused on reducing 
approval times than on ensuring that approval is appropriate, 
and further assert that the agency has been captured by the 
companies it regulates.95  Based on these and other criticisms, 
these critics argue that the pharmaceutical companies can get 
a defective drug approved by concealing unfavorable data, in-
tentionally forgoing experiments to uncover data that would 
                                                          
87 See Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Advanced Event Reporting 
System, http://www.fda.gov/cder/aers/default.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) 
(describing the AERS voluntary reporting system) [hereinafter AERS Descrip-
tion]. 
88 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(k) (2003). 
89 See AERS Description, supra note 87. 
90 See, e.g., Presentation by Nancy Haggard, Post-Marketing Adverse Drug 
Experience Manager, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/cder/present/dia-
62000/haggard/haggard.ppt (Jun. 13, 2000). 
91 See, e.g., Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of 
Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000). 
92 See, e.g., id. at 2154-55. 
93 Pharmaceutical companies disagree, noting the long-term harm caused by 
problems with products and the serious risks in litigation of hiding informa-
tion from the FDA.  See, e.g., PhRMA, Monitoring the Safety of Drugs,  
http://srpub.phrma.org/papers/12.16.98.drug.safety.html (last visited Aug. 11, 
2003). 
94 See, e.g., Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research 
Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167, 1170 (2003) 
(concluding that the sponsors of studies do affect the outcomes). 
95 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 91, at 2154 (rejecting arguments that the FDA 
has been captured by the industries it regulates). 
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render the drug not approvable, and using connections or lob-
bying power to ensure approval.96  Even with the number of 
employees at the FDA involved in evaluating a new drug, the 
sheer volume of material submitted makes them, according to 
critics, incapable of doing a genuinely in-depth analysis.97 
Similar charges are leveled at the ongoing monitoring of 
pharmaceuticals and adverse events.  The section of employees 
tracking the relevant data is sometimes characterized as un-
der-funded and under-qualified.98  As with the approval proc-
ess, critics note that adverse event data comes largely from the 
companies being regulated, and thus critics suggest that these 
data can be affected improperly by these companies.99 
Juries provide some implicit criticism as well.  Huge dam-
age rewards in pharmaceutical tort litigation indicate that at 
least some juries have concluded that certain FDA-approved 
products are not safe and effective.100  Still, it is unlikely that 
even the most ardent critic of the FDA would contend that the 
FDA’s approvals are wrong one in twenty times, while the 
USPTO itself identifies that proportion as the goal for errors in 
patent grants.101  As in the patent context, most observers tend 
to agree that the U.S. system of drug approval is among the 
best in the world.102  The FDA gets life-saving or life-improving 
drugs onto the market in a reasonable time frame while pre-
venting most drugs with a negative risk-benefit ratio from 
reaching the market.103 
                                                          
96 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO L. J. 
2049, 2076 (2000) (rejecting a regulatory compliance defense, citing flaws in 
the regulatory system). 
97 See, e.g., Arnst et al., New Drugs: Why So Many Delays?, BUSINESSWEEK, 
Mar. 11, 2002, at 62-63 (citing varied approval standards and accelerated ap-
proval of new drugs based on overeager pharmaceutical companies and an un-
der-funded FDA). 
98 See, e.g., The Food and Drug Law Institute’s 45th Annual Educational Con-
ference Keynote Addresses, 57 FOOD DRUG L. J. 227, 229-30 (2002). 
99 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 91, at 2154. 
100 See, e.g., AHP Settles Recent Verdict, 5 MEALEY’S LITIGATION REPORT: FEN-
PHEN/REDUX Iss. 1, 4 (Nov. 2001) (reporting a $9 million settlement in a case 
in which the jury had awarded $56.5 million). 
101 See Performance and Accountability Report, supra note 15, at 13. 
102 See, e.g., Symposium, Economic Models of the Emerging Biotechnology In-
dustry, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1525, 1546 (1993). 
103 One might question whether approving another in a long series of SSRIs 
(as in the hypothetical) is a useful activity for the FDA.  Without going into 
detail, there is broad agreement that having more safe and effective drugs in a 
particular class is valuable, due generally to individuals’ idiosyncratic re-
sponses to medications and to the effects of competition on drug pricing.  See 
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C. PATENT ISSUANCE AND FDA APPROVAL COMPARED 
In certain ways, the patent application and drug approval 
processes are similar.  Each can take a number of months, each 
involves evaluation by people who are at least theoretically 
trained for the job they perform, and each results in a license 
from the government for certain conduct.  On the other hand, 
the extent of the review is quite different.  The patent applica-
tion process generally represents a couple hundred of hours of 
work, including an average of only twenty hours by the exam-
iner.  In contrast, the NDA process, if it reaches completion, 
represents thousands or tens of thousands of hours of work and 
testing on thousands of patients.104  The USPTO review gener-
ally is performed by one person, or two if a supervisor is in-
volved.105  The FDA review involves a significantly larger num-
ber of people from an array of specialties.  Significantly, the 
FDA involvement continues throughout the marketing of a 
drug as well, so that the approval is not a one-time event.106  It 
is certainly fair to say that the NDA process is a much “bigger” 
process than the patent process. 
Part II of this article compares the respective systems in 
more detail. For now, it is enough to conclude that the FDA re-
view is at least as exhaustive as the USPTO’s.  With that in 
mind, this article next analyzes how the USPTO and FDA re-
views play out in litigation. 
II. THE EFFECTS OF PATENT ISSUANCE OR FDA 
APPROVAL ON LITIGATION 
A. PATENT ISSUANCE-PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY 
Despite the criticisms of the patent process outlined above, 
patents are protected by a statutory presumption of validity.107  
In recognition that the USPTO, as an agency, is considered the 
expert on patentability; juries are not permitted to find that a 
patent is invalid merely by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Instead, the finding must be by clear and convincing evi-
                                                                                                                            
In re Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (not-
ing that individual patients are affected differently by the same medication). 
104 See supra Part I.B. 
105 See supra Part I.A. 
106 See supra Part I.B. 
107 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
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dence.108  Further, juries are usually specifically instructed by 
the judge that a patent is to be presumed valid.109 
Information about the value of the patent office’s review 
comes not only from the patent-holder’s attorney, but also from 
the judge.  The psychological impact of this presumption of va-
lidity is difficult to measure.  However, it is not insignificant 
that a jury is instructed by the one nominally neutral person in 
the courtroom that it must begin deliberations with the belief 
that the patent is valid.110 
These presumptions are codified in the Patent Act of 
1952.111  Congress, implementing the Constitution’s mandate, 
had set up an agency specifically tasked to evaluate patent ap-
plications and give inventors a lengthy monopoly on their in-
ventions.  Because that agency was the specialist in determin-
ing the patentability of a particular invention, the presumption 
of validity was created, first judicially and then later codified 
by Congress.112 
While it is difficult to evaluate the effect of the presump-
tion of validity numerically, there is little doubt in the patent 
litigation bar that it is significant.  Litigants emphasize it in 
openings, in closings, and everywhere else possible.  Jury re-
search indicates that it makes a difference.113  The only person 
                                                          
108 Id. 
109 At a minimum, the jury is told that the burden of proof on invalidity must 
be met by clear and convincing evidence. See Model Patent Jury Instructions 
for the N.D.Cal., n.1 (Jan. 18, 2002).  There is some debate on whether the in-
structions should expressly include a statement that the USPTO’s determina-
tion is to be presumed correct. See id.  Regardless of whether that statement is 
included, every jury is told that invalidity must be found by a high evidentiary 
standard such as clear and convincing evidence.  See id. (discussing how the 
burden demonstrates the clear and convincing standard); see also id. at 22 (in-
dicating that the jury should find a patent invalid only if highly probable). 
110 This instruction is likely better respected than the presumption of inno-
cence.  Most jurors presumably have relatively little experience with the pat-
ent system, and thus have no reason to believe it grants patents without a 
good basis.  Yet, ample data suggests that jurors believe the fact that someone 
is charged with a crime suggests that the person likely did something wrong, 
notwithstanding constitutional presumptions.  See  The View from the Jury 
Box: Many Jurors Consider Deep Pockets and Ignore Presumption of Inno-
cence, 15 NAT’L L.J. S12 (1993). 
111 H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 2523 (1952). 
112 35 U.S.C § 282; see generally Editorial Notes, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 575 
(1953). 
113 See Nicholas M. Cannella & Timothy J. Kelly, Jury Trials and Mock Jury 
Trials, 1 PAT. LITIG. 731, 739 (1993) (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, 
and Literary Property Handbook Series No. G-375) (summarizing jury re-
search indicating a belief in extensive USPTO review and deference to that 
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in the courtroom who the jury might see as having no agenda is 
the judge, and he or she is telling the jury to presume that the 
patent is valid.114 Like the patent process itself, the presump-
tions given patent holders are the subject of extensive criti-
cism.115  Once that criticism is examined more carefully, how-
ever, it generally becomes clear that concerns about the patent 
office rather than the presumption of validity is the basis for 
the criticism.116  With some notable exceptions,117 most critics 
are not calling for an end to the presumption of validity and its 
accompanying procedural advantages, and no critics seem to 
argue that the presumption has no effect.  Rather, the critics 
argue that the patenting process should be improved. 
                                                                                                                            
review). 
114 See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical 
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 408-09 (2000) (concluding 
that juries find for the patent-holder more often than judges). 
115 See Jay Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 763-64 (2002); Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra 
note 39; FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and 
Patent Law and Policy, 8 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrptsummary.pdf (last visited Decem-
ber 15, 2003). 
116 Kesan, supra note 115, at 765-66. 
117 Jay Kesan has proposed the following as one strategy to deal with the pre-
sumed problems in the USPTO: the elimination of the presumption of validity 
if the patentee does not disclose more than the current minimal prior art, and 
in which the presumption of validity only exists with respect to disclosed prior 
art.  See Kesan, supra note 115.  Mark Lemley argues that limiting the pre-
sumption of validity to prior art references and arguments actually considered 
by the examiner would have the adverse effect of flooding the examiner with 
prior art. Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1528–1529. His ulti-
mate proposal, based on a conclusion that a very small proportion of issued 
patents are actually asserted or litigated, is that the presumption of validity 
should exist, but only require proof by a preponderance of the evidence to over-
come. Id.  In other words, we should accept the fact that we have a good, but 
not great, patent office, and treat its conclusions accordingly.  Lemley, Ra-
tional Ignorance, supra note 39, at 1528–1529. 
Recently the Federal Trade Commission urged the abandonment of the pre-
sumption of validity standard for many of the reasons cited in this article.  See 
FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent 
Law and Policy, supra note 115, at 8-20 (proposing a reduction in the burden 
of proof to a preponderance of the evidence). 
This article operates from the assumption that the presumption of validity 
makes some sense in the patent context, but the idea of eliminating the pre-
sumption entirely because the examination is so minimal adds support to my 
view that the FDA review is relatively superior to the USPTO review.  With-
out giving the subject full review, resources would generally be better allo-
cated if the presumption of validity were modified or removed rather than 
spending more money on the USPTO. 
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B. FDA APPROVAL-NO PRESUMPTION OF SAFETY 
In typical pharmaceutical litigation, a substantial portion 
of the plaintiffs’ effort is directed at undermining the FDA’s de-
termination of safety and efficacy.  In most mass tort litigation, 
defendants are accused of failing to disclose required informa-
tion to the FDA, specifically data from clinical trials, adverse 
event reports, preclinical data, or any other material informa-
tion.118  On the other hand, to build on any evidence of non-
compliance, plaintiffs spend considerable resources on efforts to 
diminish the resources or skills of the FDA.  For example, 
through an “FDA expert,” juries will hear about the FDA being 
overwhelmed with data, understaffed, or simply filled with in-
competent bureaucrats.119 
This road goes both ways.  Defendants get all the mileage 
they can from FDA approval, regardless of the actual exten-
siveness of the review and monitoring involved.  If the facts 
support it, defendants emphasize the complete and voluminous 
information provided to the FDA.  They may even bring an en-
tire NDA, possibly hundreds of boxes, into the courtroom.  They 
establish the absence of FDA sanction for any regulatory viola-
tions, and discuss at length the approval and ongoing monitor-
ing process discussed above.120  If they have “clean” reports 
from FDA audits or inspections, those reports will surely be 
blown up on large demonstrative exhibits. 
From the defense’s perspective, juries will hear about the 
FDA as a model government agency second to none.  Its em-
ployees are impeccably thorough, highly trained, unrivaled in 
                                                          
118 For example, the public interest group Public Citizen requested that 
criminal charges be brought against Abbott Laboratories for allegedly failing 
to comply with reporting requirements regarding eight deaths and other ad-
verse events among patients taking the diet drug Meridia.  Sidney M. Wolfe, 
Letter to Dept. of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7175.  These allegations 
almost immediately made their way into plaintiffs’ attorneys’ advertising for 
clients.  See, e.g., Belluck & Fox, LLP, All About Meridia’s Dangers, at 
http://www.meridiarecall.com/news.htm.  These allegations can be analogized 
to claims of inequitable conduct in patent applications where patentees are 
alleged to have withheld material prior art or other information from the Pat-
ent Office.  Michael Green has suggested that having a compliance defense 
based on compliance with regulatory requirements would shift the focus of 
litigation to proving noncompliance rather than reducing the litigation overall.  
See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining 
the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 507-09 (1997). 
119 See, e.g., Medrano v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., No. B-150-760-B (Tex. Dist. 
Ct. Apr. 9, 1999) (cited in 2 No. 9 Andrews Diet Drugs Litig. Rep. 14). 
120 See supra Part I.B. 
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their dedication to patient safety, and never hesitant to act 
when needed, despite any commercial consequences.  The ap-
proval process is the model for the world and is nearly perfect, 
as the argument goes. 
The current tort system is the subject of extensive criti-
cism, largely from those who believe it exposes defendants to 
too much liability based on bad science.  This criticism ranges 
from editorials in the popular press warning of dire conse-
quences121 to the academic press.122  The first line of criticisms 
generally focuses on prominent verdicts based on purportedly 
unfounded expert testimony that ultimately convinces a jury 
that causation exists where the weight of scientific evidence 
says it does not.  Often, the critics argue that the threat of 
large and unjustifiable verdicts against pharmaceutical com-
panies risks dampening the quest for new drugs to treat seri-
ous diseases or conditions. 
Certain states have implemented an “FDA defense” that 
allows pharmaceutical defendants to receive either presump-
tions in their favor or general immunity from punitive damages 
with certain exceptions.123  Texas’s implementation of the “FDA 
defense”, which is the closest to this article’s proposal, has only 
been in effect for a few months.124  The application and results 
of the defense should be interesting, given the enormous 
amount of litigation surrounding the pharmaceutical industry 
centered in Texas. 
If Texas’s statute withstands the inevitable constitutional 
challenges, FDA-approved drugs will receive, in the context of 
failure-to-warn cases, a rebuttable presumption that the label-
ing is appropriate.  The presumption can be overcome by show-
ing that the defendant (a) made material misrepresentations to 
the FDA, (b) continued to sell the drug after being ordered to 
withdraw it by the FDA, (c) recommended off-label use, or (d) 
                                                          
121 See, e.g., Shad Rowe, Texas Tort Reform Can Be a Model for Other States, 
HOUSTON BUS. J. (July 11, 2003), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2003/07/14/editorial4.html. 
122 See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Qual-
ity: The Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 163, 
165 (1998). 
123 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (precluding suit if the drug in ques-
tion is FDA approved and the manufacturer complied with relevant regula-
tions); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 82.007& 82.008(a) (2004). 
124 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 82.007 & 82.008(a) (2004); see Rowe, su-
pra note 124. 
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prescribed an off-label use.125 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF DEFERENCE 
One reaction to the situations described above is the con-
clusion that all agency decisions should be treated the same in 
litigation.  After all, each agency, whether it is the FDA, the 
USPTO, or some other agency, is presumably an expert in its 
field and should be accorded some deference as a result.  Nev-
ertheless, the level of review and the interests being protected 
vary dramatically among various agencies.126  Furthermore, in 
litigation implicating agency determinations, the interests of 
the courts will vary dramatically.  This part of the article ad-
dresses some of those interests, and suggests what factors 
should be considered when considering the agencies in ques-
tion. 
A. GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN EACH AGENCY 
Through its myriad agencies, the federal government 
makes thousands of decisions daily, from approvals of political 
marches in national parks to the issuance of patents.  Most of 
those decisions could ultimately end up being challenged in 
court, whether by parties arguing that the criteria applied were 
unconstitutional, or by parties disputing the factual basis of the 
decisions.  As outlined above, how these decisions are consid-
ered in litigation varies rather dramatically, at least in the two 
example situations.  The purpose of the agencies’ determina-
tions is thus a first question in deciding whether the present 
treatment of patent approvals and FDA approvals is appropri-
ate. 
1. The USPTO 
The USPTO was established by Congress “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.”127  The primary role of the 
USPTO is to issue patents, but some commentators argue that 
                                                          
125 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(b) (2004). 
126 As described below, the agencies’ treatments are arguably reversed: the 
more thorough agency gets less deference.  Yet, the elements explored en route 
to that conclusion do indicate that different treatment can be appropriate. 
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8. 
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it takes that goal too far by issuing too many of them.128  An 
initial question, then, is whether we want the government to 
issue patents at all.  A robust patent system is often considered 
critical to maintaining a steady stream of innovations resulting 
in economic stimulus and technological advancement.129  To put 
it in the hypothetical’s context, if MegaPharma genuinely did 
invent the SSRI in question but the patent system did not ex-
ist, a generic drug company would, as a result of avoiding the 
research and development costs incurred by MegaPharma, rap-
idly release a generic version of Phelox and charge less for it.  
Therefore, MegaPharma would lose its incentive to innovate. 
On the other hand, the desire to provide incentives to in-
novate is not the same as a desire to issue undeserved patents.  
An incorrectly issued patent causes significant harm as well, 
since companies that would otherwise consider entering the 
market might stay out as a result.  Furthermore, if another 
company thought the patent was invalid, the financial hurdle 
created by having to litigate the patent’s validity is sizable and, 
especially considering the presumption of validity, carries a 
large element of risk.130 
It is important to note that an incorrectly issued patent 
will not have an adverse effect on the public at large, except in-
sofar as it will have the potential to slow innovation.  In most 
cases, it is not likely to put citizens’ health or lives in danger.131  
Moreover, a very small proportion of patents are actually liti-
gated.  Most sit in a binder, and a surprising number are aban-
doned.132 
                                                          
128 See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text. 
129 But see Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, supra 
note 52 (suggesting that in the age of venture capital, the incentive of innova-
tion is no longer as significant a factor in innovation as it once was). 
130 Attorneys’ fees are available only in “exceptional” cases.  35 U.S.C. § 285.  
Again, there have been proposals for increasing the availability of fees in the 
context of patents that are found to be invalid.  See Kesan, supra note 115. 
131 In the pharmaceutical context, notable exceptions exist.  The most public-
ity in recent years has focused on patent protection for drugs that treat life-
threatening diseases.  As of this writing, the World Trade Organization is on 
the verge of approving a pact to permit the elimination of patent protection on 
certain AIDS drugs for low-cost distribution in developing countries.  See WTO 
Votes To Bypass Patents on Medicines Cheap Generics Go To Poor Nations, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2003, at A16.  Less health-oriented but still important 
is the fact that an improperly granted patent may result in the public paying 
monopoly prices when it should not have to do so.  Notwithstanding these im-
portant exceptions, this article maintains that most patent grants or denials 
have minimal impact on the public, whether the decisions are right or wrong. 
132 Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39. 
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When presented with a close call on whether or not to issue 
a patent, one might appropriately conclude that the USPTO 
should grant the patent.  Granting patents is, after all, its mis-
sion; and the negatives of getting it wrong, while not negligible, 
are not devastating.133  In short, the government’s interest in 
the USPTO includes granting patents, as well as making cor-
rect decisions on patentability most of the time.  The USPTO’s 
mistakes get fixed by the courts and, for the most part, cause 
compensable financial harm without enormous public prob-
lems. 
2. FDA 
The FDA is, at its foundation, a public health agency.  Its 
mission is to: 
(1) promote the public health by promptly and efficiently 
reviewing clinical research and taking appropriate action on 
the marketing of regulated products in a timely manner; 
(2) with respect to such products, protect the public health 
by ensuring that— 
(A) foods are safe, wholesome, sanitary, and properly la-
beled; 
(B) human and veterinary drugs are safe and effective; 
(C) there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effec-
tiveness of devices intended for human use; 
(D) cosmetics are safe and properly labeled; and 
(E) public health and safety are protected from electronic 
product radiation; 
(3) participate through appropriate processes with repre-
sentatives of other countries to reduce the burden of regulation, 
harmonize regulatory requirements, and achieve appropriate 
reciprocal arrangements; and 
(4) as determined to be appropriate by the Secretary, carry 
out paragraphs (1) through (3) in consultation with experts in 
science, medicine, and public health, and in cooperation with 
consumers, users, manufacturers, importers, packers, distribu-
tors, and retailers of regulated products.134 
The FDA does not exist to stimulate the economy, or to en-
                                                          
133 Recall the earlier discussion of the quality goals of the USPTO.  See supra 
Part I.A.  Mark Lemley notes that the Patent Office has had (at least at one 
point) a large poster by its entrance stating that its goal was to “help[] our 
customers get patents.”  Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39, at n.3. 
134 FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 § 406. 
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sure the rapid delivery of drugs to consumers.  It exists to 
“promote” and “protect” the public health and, in the pharma-
ceutical context, to ensure that drugs are “safe and effective.”135  
The approval of a drug that is either unsafe or ineffective has 
the potential to cause serious injury or death.  On a more mun-
dane but still important note, it may also result in public and 
private funds being spent on drugs that are less safe or less ef-
fective than believed by consumers. 
The fact that the role of the FDA does not include stimulat-
ing the economy does not mean that its decisions have no eco-
nomic impact.  Pfizer, the largest research-based pharmaceuti-
cal company, now has the third largest market capitalization in 
the world,136 and health care expenses continue to consume a 
large portion of the United States gross domestic product.137  
New drugs can help productivity, reduce (or increase) health 
care costs, and extend the productive (or nonproductive) life of 
residents.  Nonetheless, the purpose of the FDA is, at least 
nominally, to protect and promote the public health independ-
ent of the economic impact of its decisions.138 
Another factor relevant to the interests in play relates to 
the use of the licenses.  As noted earlier, a very small percent-
age of issued patents ever get “used.”  In contrast, virtually all 
approved drugs are marketed. While a mistake in the patent 
context is very likely never to get noticed, a mistake in approv-
ing a drug almost certainly will. 
If the core motivation of the FDA is indeed public health, 
then a close call with respect to safety should be made on the 
side of caution, and every question relating to safety should be 
examined with great care.  Mistakes will happen, but they 
should rarely be tolerated.  Review of mistakes should be exam-
ined more carefully than in other contexts.  Though damage 
                                                          
135 Id. 
136 Pfizer.com., Pfizer and Pharmacia Combine Operations, Create World’s 
Largest Research-Based Pharmaceutical Company, 
http://www.pfizer.com/are/investors_releases/ 
mn_2003_0416.cfm (Apr. 16, 2003). 
137 Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Program Information: On Medi-
care, Medicaid, SCHIP & Other Programs of the Centers for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services, 3, http://cms.hhs.gov/charts/series/sec1.pdf (Jun. 2002).  The 
most current statistics indicate that health care costs have generally stabi-
lized at around 13% of the gross domestic product.  See id. 
138 The most recent public example of an FDA decision affecting a company’s 
fortunes is likely the rejection of ImClone’s cancer drug Erbitux.  See Nancy 
Dillon, Cancer Drug Woes Add to Imclone Ills, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 20, 2002, at 
59. 
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awards received in litigation can help to alleviate the impact of 
a mistake, few would argue that money can restore the damage 
caused by a defective drug. 
Therefore, the government’s interest in the drug approval 
process is protecting the public by approving only safe and ef-
fective ones.  If an error is to occur, it should occur on the side 
of caution.  In other words, if the FDA believed that Phelox 
might cause tremor so as to make the drug’s risk-benefit ratio 
negative, it should have rejected MegaPharma’s NDA. 
B. JUDICIAL INTERESTS IN AGENCY DECISIONS 
Regardless of the extent of an agency’s efforts, mistakes 
are bound to occur.  Invariably, these mistakes will result in 
litigation that questions the correctness of an agency’s deci-
sions.  This article now addresses what interests are repre-
sented in such litigation. 
1. Patent Litigation 
The most direct impact of patent litigation is on the liti-
gants themselves.  In general, one litigant holds a patent and 
seeks to exclude others from performing infringing acts (e.g., 
making a product that infringes), while the other litigant con-
tends either that it does not infringe or, relevant to this analy-
sis, that the patent is invalid.  The impact on each party is gen-
erally financial and can range from a minor inconvenience to a 
bet-the-company proposition. 
The impact is not limited to the litigants, however.  In the 
hypothetical outlined at the start of this article, for example, 
the availability of a generic version of Phelox would provide a 
cheaper SSRI to patients or their Health Maintenance Organi-
zations.  One need only look at the explosion in pharmaceutical 
treatment options for depression to see that the introduction of 
new treatments can have significant societal impact.139 
Except for rare circumstances, however, most patent litiga-
tion, while not entirely separated from daily life, has a limited 
scope of effect.  As a result, the courts’ interests are similarly 
limited.  The courts wish to determine whether the patent was 
properly granted given the state of knowledge at the time.  If it 
                                                          
139 The first major SSRI, Prozac, has been taken by over 40 million people 
worldwide, according to its name-brand manufacturer.  See Prozac.com, How 
Prozac Can Help: Prozac Makes History, http://www.prozac.com/index.jsp (last 
visited March 27, 2004.). 
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was properly granted and thus infringed, one party will owe 
the other party money, and an injunction will likely issue.  If 
the patent is found invalid, the accused infringer can continue 
their actions, and attorneys’ fees may be granted to the party 
proving invalidity.  In either case, the result is fundamentally 
economic.140 Most inventors believe patents are beneficial, even 
if that patent might later be held invalid.  Unless the patent is 
obtained fraudulently, the danger of having to pay more than 
attorneys’ fees is minor, and even a questionable patent is more 
beneficial in negotiations than no patent at all.  In other words, 
patent litigation plays a relatively minor role in regulating 
conduct within the bounds of non-fraudulent behavior before 
the patent office.  Therefore, an inventor is unlikely to not ap-
ply for a patent because of a fear that it might later be found 
invalid. 
2. Pharmaceutical Tort Litigation 
Parties in pharmaceutical tort litigation argue over 
whether or not the FDA correctly approved a drug.  The impact 
of FDA mistakes may be broader and more emotionally signifi-
cant.  In the case of FDA approval of a drug, a mistake141 has 
the potential to affect a great number of consumers.  SSRIs, for 
example, are prescribed to tens of millions of people worldwide 
every year.142  This article’s hypothetical five percent market 
share for Phelox would reflect an enormous patient population 
since litigation over the drug’s safety would potentially have an 
impact on all of them.143 
Similar to patent litigation, in pharmaceutical tort litiga-
tion, a liable defendant pays damages to the plaintiff.  There 
are, however, two important differences between the two types 
of litigation.  First, litigation over pharmaceutical drugs elicits 
emotion because it involves human life and health.  Second, 
there is a significant industry effect beyond the scope of the in-
dividual litigation.  Purely compensatory damages paid by a 
                                                          
140 This is an oversimplification, but provides a generally accurate overview. 
141 Here the mistake refers to approving a pharmaceutical drug that later 
proves to be unsafe for consumption. 
142 See FTC Order Clears Way for $90 Billion Merger of Pfizer Inc. and War-
ner-Lambert Company, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/06/pfizer.htm 
(2000) (U.S. sales of SSRI/SNRI [selective norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors] 
antidepressants total approximately $7 billion annually). 
143 Five percent of the seven billion dollar market in 2000 is 350 million dol-
lars, which means the total number of customers could easily reach tens of 
millions. See id. 
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drug manufacturer can rapidly reach to millions of dollars or 
more if punitive damages are awarded and upheld.144  Defense 
costs can easily reach to billions of dollars.145  It is possible that 
blockbuster drugs could remain profitable even after massive 
products liability litigation.  However, unlike a patentee’s deci-
sion with respect to a potentially invalid patent, many drug 
manufacturers would rather make no drug than an improperly 
approved drug due to these costs.146 
Thus, the issues involved in determining whether the FDA 
made a mistake in approving an unsafe drug are somewhat dif-
ferent than those underlying a USPTO error in issuing a pat-
ent.  The potential group impacted by the FDA decision is lar-
ger, and the impact is more personal.  Furthermore, the 
litigation has a larger potential impact on regulation of indus-
try. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE “REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE DEFENSE” 
This article’s hypothetical situation deals with two ques-
tions.  The first question asks whether or not the USPTO 
should have issued a patent for Phelox.  The second question 
asks whether or not it was a mistake for the FDA to approve 
Phelox.  Currently, a presumption of validity would likely up-
hold the issuance of the patent by the USPTO.  In the absence 
of a presumption of safety, however, a jury is likely to find that 
Phelox was unsafe because its risk-benefit ratio is negative.  
This article argues that a company that has complied with all 
relevant FDA regulatory requirements should receive some 
                                                          
144See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (re-
stricting the availability and size of punitive damage awards under the due 
process clause).  “[P]unitive damages should only be awarded if the 
defendant’s culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, 
is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanc-
tions to achieve punishment or deterrence.” Id. at 1251. 
145 Up to 90,000 Opt Out of AHP Settlement; 61,000 File Claims, 6 MEALEY’S 
LITIG. REP. FEN-PHEN /REDUX 2, 1-2 (2003) (noting that one manufacturer in-
volved in the diet drug litigation has set aside $14 billion as its reserve for the 
litigation). 
146 This is at least suggested by the ratio of drugs that make it through the 
development process.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text.  Of course, 
certain blockbuster drugs (generally thought of as drugs with annual sales of 
over a billion dollars) might remain profitable even after massive products li-
ability litigation.  In the current environment, this article contends that a 
profit on any drug with a significant safety problem is unlikely at best.  See 
supra note 54. 
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protection from tort suits like the protection enjoyed by patent-
ees. 
Academic discussions of a “regulatory” defense in the tort 
context have been binary: either FDA compliance should pro-
vide immunity with few exceptions147 or the system should re-
main largely unchanged with some incremental modifications 
as to how cases are handled.148  The discussions also tend to 
consider regulatory compliance defenses either in a single lim-
ited agency context (frequently the FDA), or all together, ad-
dressing a wide range of regulatory activities.  As outlined 
throughout this article, the settings of different regulatory pro-
ceedings should be considered, and each regulatory context 
should be considered separately.  When this approach is fol-
lowed in connection with FDA-approved drugs, a third resolu-
tion becomes a distinct possibility. 
This third resolution is presented after discussion of the 
two main approaches to a “regulatory defense” in the FDA con-
text, demonstrated by recent articles by Professors Robert 
Rabin and Richard Stewart.149  This part examines what les-
sons can be learned from comparing the FDA context to the 
USPTO context, and it concludes that the comparison suggests 
a different treatment for FDA approvals.  This different treat-
ment is comparable to the treatment of issued patents with re-
spect to their validity. 
A. THE POSITION AGAINST PRECLUSION 
In the keynote paper of the Georgetown Law Journal sym-
posium, Professor Rabin concluded that the case for a regula-
tory compliance defense150 was “an uneasy proposition.”151  In 
regard to litigant competency, Rabin wrote that the tort system 
maintained a role as an “information-generating mechanism 
                                                          
147 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Li-
ability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000) (summariz-
ing the continued soundness of the 1991 American Law Institute Reporter’s 
Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury). 
148 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Keynote Paper: Reassessing Regulatory Compli-
ance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000) (discussing the proper role of regulatory com-
pliance as a way to limit traditional functions of the tort system). 
149 See supra notes 147-48. These articles do not encapsulate the entire range 
of arguments existing, but are a convenient summary of the most relevant ar-
guments. 
150 The preclusion of a tort suit based on regulatory compliance. Rabin, supra 
note 148. 
151 Id. at 2053.  Professor Rabin focuses largely on the American Law Insti-
tute’s 1991 proposal, discussed infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text. 
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and as a compensatory system.”152  As for system competency, 
Professor Rabin first acknowledged that the tort system, in its 
recent history, has been imperfect in reaching scientifically jus-
tifiable conclusions, citing the Bendectin153 and breast implant 
litigation.154  Nonetheless, he noted that the judicial system 
has made some progress towards ameliorating these problems, 
generally through strengthening the judicial role as a gate-
keeper for expert testimony under Daubert155 and Kumho 
Tire.156  The judicial system has also made improvements 
through innovative judicial efforts to obtain unbiased expert 
opinions, such as Judge Pointer’s expert panel in the breast 
implant multidistrict litigation.157 
In addition to the modest improvements in gate-keeping 
regarding expert testimony158, Rabin also considered the im-
portance of the tort system as a means to uncover “bad con-
duct” – cover-ups, a failure to disclose data to the FDA, inap-
propriate marketing, and the like.  With the FDA relationship 
fundamentally nonadversarial, there presently exists no agency 
or group of people besides plaintiffs’ lawyers with an interest in 
uncovering such wrongdoing.159  While most proposals for a 
broad regulatory compliance defense maintain an exception for 
fraud, Rabin argued that the exception was too narrow.160  He 
noted that, for example, alleged fraudulent behavior by tobacco 
companies was not uncovered by people seeking to prove fraud, 
but by people seeking to prove negligence in failure to warn.  If 
a broad defense containing a fraud exception were in place, the 
investigations that uncover fraud would potentially never oc-
cur.161 
                                                          
152 Rabin, supra note 148, at 2061. 
153 Id. at 2063; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) (plaintiffs suing defendant pharmaceutical company to recover for birth 
defects allegedly sustained as result of mother’s ingestion of anti-nausea drug 
Bendectin). 
154 See Rabin, supra note 148, at 2061-63. 
155 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (identifying a judicial “gatekeeper” role in evalu-
ating the validity and reliability of scientific evidence). 
156 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-151 (1999) (clarifying 
that Daubert applies to all expert testimony, not just that denominated “scien-
tific,” and also declaring the factors for evaluating proffered opinion testimony 
identified in Daubert as nonexclusive). 
157 See Rabin, supra note 148, at 2064-68. 
158 See id. at 2067-68. 
159 Id. at 2069. 
160 See id. at 2070. 
161 See id. 
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The second justification for the tort system, according to 
Rabin, is its role in the enforcement of compensation.162  He 
first observed that many of the debates regarding a regulatory 
defense assume that the standard applied will always be the 
risk-benefit analysis.163  However, if a version of California’s 
consumer-expectations theory, which makes the tort system 
closer to a risk spreading system, is applied, a regulatory de-
fense fits less well.164  As Rabin observed, a state could ration-
ally decide to make its tort system a means for spreading the 
risk of harm from pharmaceuticals, even when the drugs are 
“safe” under a risk-benefit analysis.165  Using the tort system as 
this sort of no-fault insurance scheme is not its best use, as 
Rabin noted.166  However, it is another factor that points in fa-
vor of keeping a role for the tort system. 
Lastly, Professor Rabin discussed the implementation of 
the broad regulatory compliance defense, and contended that it 
faces numerous real-world problems.167  Among them is the 
possibility that the FDA is not “optimally stringent” or absent 
of political pressure, as well as the danger that the fraud excep-
tion would swallow the rule.168 Finally, and most importantly, 
Rabin looked at all potential situations that would take place 
outside of the FDA’s careful approval process.  Even assuming 
that the FDA’s pre-marketing analysis is optimally stringent, 
the roles that off-label usage, side effects not appearing in the 
clinical trials, or over-promotions play must be determined.169  
Alleged injuries resulting from these contexts are common-
place.170  Therefore, basing a broad defense in those post-
marketing cases on the pre-marketing review suggests that a 
regulatory compliance defense may not prove to be successful. 
B. THE POSITION FOR PRECLUSION 
The foundational document for most arguments in favor of 
preclusion is the American Law Institute’s 1991 Reporter’s 
                                                          
162 See id. at 2071-74. 
163 See id. 
164 See id. at 2072-73. 
165 See id. at 2072-73. 
166 See id. at 2073-74. 
167 See id. at 2082. 
168 See id. at 2076-77. 
169 See id. at 2077-82. 
170 See id. 
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Study.171  The study recommended that “subject to certain care-
fully tailored conditions and limitations, compliance with regu-
latory requirements imposed by an administrative agency 
should preclude tort liability based on negligence.”172  The for-
mer Chief Reporter of the report, Professor Richard Stewart, 
contributed his defense of the proposal to the symposium refer-
enced above.173 
The ALI’s (and Stewart’s) proposal provides immunity if (a) 
the risk was under the control of a “specialized administrative 
agency” with “statutory authority to monitor and assess risk-
creating activities”, and with a “mandate to establish” controls 
on relevant behavior; (b) the defendant complied with all rele-
vant regulatory requirements; and (c) the defendant disclosed 
to the agency all material information it has about the risks 
and their control, including any indication that the agency’s 
approach might be inadequate.174  “Tort litigation, in practical 
effect, amounts to a second, duplicative system of review of the 
agency’s decision, conducted in accordance with quite different 
procedures and principles.”175  In other words, the FDA makes 
an informed decision with extensive data available, yet juries 
frequently disregard these data and make decisions that are 
unsupported by science. 
Professor Stewart notes the improvements in the gate-
keeping efforts described by Professor Rabin and agrees that 
they are good ideas.176  He concludes, however, that the institu-
tional improvements that have begun in the judicial system are 
stronger evidence that the tort system’s role should be aban-
doned.177  He suggests that those improvements are efforts to 
make the tort system more like the FDA, with more expert in-
volvement and more decisions made by analytical individuals 
rather than juries.178  Therefore, he concludes that if the way to 
                                                          
171 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTER’S STUDY, ENTERPRISE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991).  This Study is not limited to 
pharmaceuticals. 
172 Stewart, supra note 147, at 2167. 
173 See id. at 2167 n.1. 
174 See id. at 2168.  While the ALI proposal would limit the defense in all 
situations where imposing tort liability, in addition to regulation, is likely 
counterproductive, the exchange between Rabin and Stewart is focused on the 
FDA-pharmaceutical context.  See supra notes 147-48. 
175 Stewart, supra note 147, at 2178. 
176 See id. at 2177. 
177 See id. at 2179. 
178 See id. 
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fix the tort system is to make it like the FDA, the tort system is 
not needed.179  “Why reinvent the wheel?”180 
He then turns to Professor Rabin’s contention that the tort 
system maintains an important role in information gathering 
and in compensation schemes. Professor Stewart again con-
cludes that these roles fall short of justifying the current sys-
tem.181  As for information gathering, the “ferreting out in-
stances of firms’ nondisclosure,”182 Professor Stewart first 
acknowledges that this role is indeed an important aspect of 
the tort system.183  However, he contends that the ALI Study 
proposal was designed precisely to accomplish that goal.184 In 
particular, the proposal requires that a defendant “seeking to 
invoke compliance preclusion” must have “provided the regula-
tory agency in a timely fashion with all relevant risk informa-
tion in the defendant’s possession regarding not only the risks 
associated with its products and processes but also the means 
of risk control, regardless of whether the regulatory program in 
question imposes such an obligation.”185  This requirement 
would in his view allow plaintiffs’ attorneys to be incentivized 
to find potential wrongdoing.186 
As for the compensation role of the tort system, Professor 
Stewart agrees that compensation may be an important socie-
tal goal, given the fact that no drug is risk free.  Nonetheless, 
he contends that the tort system is an exceedingly inferior ap-
proach to such compensation, especially compared to programs 
such as the national vaccine compensation program.187 
Even if the tort system was the only option for compensa-
tion, he rejects Professor Rabin’s argument that it works.  
First, it requires a strict liability standard, which is not what 
most states, even those applying the “consumer expectations” 
test, impose.188  Rather, a finding of fault under such a test is 
“tantamount to a determination that the product should never 
have been marketed,” contrary to the idea of providing compen-
                                                          
179 See id. 
180 Id. 
181 See id. at 2180-81. 
182 Id. at 2180. 
183 See id. at 2179. 
184 See id. at 2180. 
185 Id. 
186 See id. at 2180-81. 
187 See id. at 2181–82. 
188 The consumer expectations test allows jurors to find a product defective if 
it fails to meet consumers’ expectations of safety.  Id. at 2183. 
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sation even for products with a positive risk-benefit ratio.189  
He also notes that the “consumer expectations” test is not ap-
plicable to “technically complex” products, presumably includ-
ing pharmaceuticals.190  Finally, he points out that the “con-
sumer expectations” test is simply not recognized in many 
jurisdictions.191 
Professor Stewart provides a brief discussion of Professor 
Rabin’s concerns about off-label usage, risks that come up only 
in the post-marketing time period, and over-promotions.192  The 
preclusion Stewart advocates applies only to regulated uses 
(i.e., not off-label usage).193 Further, Stewart argues that the 
disclosure requirement would create an incentive to disclose in-
formation about post-marketing risks.194 
C. A MIDDLE GROUND: LEARNING FROM THE PATENT CONTEXT 
Professors Rabin and Stewart present two different ap-
proaches to FDA decisions in tort litigation.  Comparing pat-
ents and FDA approvals suggests a third way.  The treatment 
of issued patents in validity proceedings can be a model for the 
treatment of approved pharmaceuticals in tort litigation.  This 
article contends that a policy that presumes safety and efficacy 
is supported both as a matter of consistency between different 
agency’s decisions, and as a matter of policy because it resolves 
or reduces many of the concerns of both Professors Rabin and 
Stewart. 
1. A Presumption of Safety and Efficacy 
The factors that should be considered in determining how 
to implement agency decisions in litigation include the strength 
of the process at each agency, the interests furthered in litiga-
tion, the interests and incentives among the parties involved, 
and, most generally, the risks of an incorrect decision by the 
agency.  Therefore, when comparing the patent and FDA con-
texts to decide whether the approach taken with issued patents 
should be imported to the pharmaceutical tort context, these 
factors must be evaluated.  All but one of these factors support 
giving FDA decisions at least the deference received by USPTO 
                                                          
189 Id. at 2183-84. 
190 Id.  at 2184-85. 
191 See id. at 2185. 
192 See id. at 2185-86. 
193 See id. at 2186. 
194 See id. 
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patent grants.195  While the evaluation is not merely checking 
off boxes on a list and counting check marks, a brief summary 
is helpful. 
First, the FDA’s review process is as comprehensive as the 
USPTO’s, regardless of the difference in scope of reviewed is-
sues.196  The questions the FDA is required to answer are cer-
tainly more intense, and the process it goes through is more 
thorough.  The presumption of validity is based on approxi-
mately twenty hours of consideration by the USPTO, whereas 
hundreds or thousands of hours, including ongoing post-
marketing approval analysis of the risk-benefit ratio, are per-
formed by the FDA. 
Second, the FDA’s core mission is the protection of public 
health, while the USPTO’s mission is the issuance of patents.  
This difference in goals may make a difference in results.  Gen-
erally, the FDA’s client is the public, while the USPTO’s client 
is the applicant.197  The FDA is therefore likely to err on the 
side of caution more often than the USPTO. 
Third, the incentives of the applicants differ.  A company 
seeking approval of a pharmaceutical has incentives not to pur-
sue a drug that may be unsafe.  On the other hand, an inventor 
pursuing a patent that might later be found invalid has few in-
centives to abandon the application.198 
On the other hand, the issues at stake in the two contexts 
do differ.  The risks of a wrong decision are broader and more 
psychologically significant in the context of drugs.  An improper 
approval of a drug can ultimately end in the loss of life.199  
Even with the difference in effects of wrong decisions, the two 
systems are structured and operated in such a way that the 
risk of a wrong decision taking place at the FDA is significantly 
lower than at the USPTO. The systems are appropriately de-
signed to reduce the odds of an unsafe drug making it through 
the system while spending less effort on the prevention of inva-
lid patents.200 
                                                          
195 This discussion presumes that the presumption of validity is legitimate in 
the patent context.  As this article discusses above, there are those who be-
lieve that it should be narrowed or eliminated, including the FTC. See supra 
notes 115-19 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra Part I.C. 
197 See supra Part III.A.1-2. 
198 See supra Part III.B.1-2.  As noted previously, there are incentives to not 
be dishonest in advocacy, which is where cost-shifting becomes a genuine risk. 
199 See supra Part III.B.2. 
200 See supra Part I. 
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With these factors in mind, the disjunction in treatment 
between approved patents and approved drugs makes little 
sense.  At a minimum, an FDA-approved drug should receive 
comparable treatment to a patent issued by the USPTO.  An 
analysis of what constitutes comparable treatment follows. 
First, recall what rights MegaPharma receives from an is-
sued patent.  MegaPharma’s patent is presumed valid, and the 
jury must conclude by clear and convincing evidence that it is 
not valid in order to overcome the presumption.201  This pre-
sumption exists even when the party claiming invalidity is bas-
ing its case on prior art not presented to the USPTO.202  Thus, 
if GenerDrugs had one piece of highly relevant but obscure 
prior art that the patent examiner had never found, Gener-
Drugs would still be required to overcome the same presump-
tion of validity.  The fact-finder could consider a broad range of 
evidence in making its determination, from prior art not pre-
sented, to arguments made with respect to that prior art, and 
finally to the persuasive power of the statements made in the 
prosecution history resulting in the patent’s issuance. 
Treating FDA approval the same way would thus require a 
broad presumption of safety and efficacy.  In other words, the 
jury would be instructed that once the FDA approved Phelox, it 
is presumed to be safe and effective.  Further, the jury would 
be told that it must be convinced by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the FDA’s decision was wrong.  As in the patent con-
text, a broad range of evidence would be relevant to that de-
termination, including any information not presented to the 
FDA by MegaPharma,203 and information about risks that 
arose after the most recent conclusion by the FDA that the 
drug was safe and effective.204 
Perhaps more controversially, the presumption would be in 
place whether or not the complaint involved on-label or off-
label usage, or over-promotion.  In either case, off-label usage 
or over-promotion by the defendant would be considered, but, 
                                                          
201 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
202 See 35 U.S.C. §282. 
203 In the patent context, even what would roughly be considered fraud – e.g., 
the intentional nondisclosure of material prior art – must be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence in order to render the patent unenforceable.  See 
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
204 Recall that the FDA reconsiders its submitted data, including adverse 
event reports, any time there is an updated package insert in order to deter-
mine if the product remains safe and effective. 
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just as with unconsidered prior art in the patent context, it 
would not make the presumption inapplicable.205 
The proposal set forth above may seem a bit sparse in de-
tails.  It does not include, for example, an exhaustive list of fac-
tors to put into jury instructions regarding the presumption, 
nor does it set forth precisely how such a presumption would be 
implemented.  At this point, the goal of this article is merely to 
provide a new starting point for a discussion.  Moreover, an ad-
vantage of a presumption, as opposed to outright preclusion, is 
that it maintains a great deal of evidentiary flexibility.  A 
pharmaceutical trial implementing this presumption would 
look very similar to those held today, except for the jury in-
structions and arguments relating to those instructions.206 
2. Presumption of Safety and Efficacy-Addressing Concerns 
about the Regulatory Compliance Defense 
A rebuttable presumption of safety and efficacy for FDA-
approved drugs provides a solution for some of the concerns ex-
pressed by Professors Rabin and Stewart.  First, the full pre-
clusion urged by Stewart leaves potentially too small an incen-
tive for the investigations that both Rabin and Stewart believe 
are important.  The problem is the one identified by Professor 
Rabin: much “bad conduct” is only discovered through discovery 
for more garden-variety torts.  Making it somewhat harder to 
prove negligence will reduce the number of marginal cases 
where the evidence of a negative risk-benefit ratio is scant, but 
still permits for successful suits when the FDA simply got it 
wrong without any bad conduct by the drug’s manufacturer.  
Those suits will occasionally undercover bad conduct that out-
side of the tort system would remain hidden. 
Second, the increased burden of proof would provide an-
other institutional improvement along with those ongoing im-
                                                          
205 This presumption of safety even in off-label usage is analogous to the fact 
that even allegations that a patent is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct 
still must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
206 This article’s proposal differs from Texas’s new statute that provides for a 
limited set of bases for overcoming the presumption.  See supra notes 123-25 
and accompanying text. 
The proposal also does not directly address punitive damages.  Given this arti-
cle’s approach – and no obvious source from the patent context from which to 
analogize – this article does not reach a conclusion about how FDA approval 
should affect the availability of punitive damages, if at all.  The addition of a 
presumption of safety may well support making FDA approval at least a sig-
nificant factor in, if not a bar to, the recovery of punitive damages.  A full de-
termination will have to wait for another day. 
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provements discussed by Professor Rabin.207  If the plaintiff is 
required to make its case by an increased burden of proof, a 
judge may be more comfortable in taking the Daubert and 
Kumho Tire decisions seriously, and dismissing baseless cases.  
This increased burden of proof would help give a judge a 
greater sense of security in connection with appeals as well. 
Third, though Professor Stewart’s point that the tort sys-
tem is an imprecise means for providing compensation is 
sound, to whatever extent its role for compensation is impor-
tant, this proposal maintains it. 
Fourth, the presumption of safety and efficacy maintains a 
significant incentive for the drug sponsors to keep the FDA 
fully apprised of data regarding drugs, and to keep the package 
insert updated.  The presumption would be “renewed” each 
time the FDA renewed its safety and efficacy determination.  
Furthermore, the company’s compliance or noncompliance with 
data-sharing requirements should be a factor in deciding 
whether or not to disregard the FDA’s conclusions. 
Finally, the presumption of safety and efficacy provides the 
flexibility lacking in outright preclusion.  In each case, a judge 
may determine if the situation is relevant to the presumption, 
or even provide specific jury instructions on the topic. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A presumption of safety and efficacy for FDA-approved 
pharmaceuticals is supported by comparing the FDA’s system 
to the USPTO’s system.  It maintains the basic outlines of the 
current tort system, but requires additional evidence to obtain 
a recovery.  Moreover, it expressly tells the jury that the FDA 
decision is to be presumed correct.  It provides judges with ad-
ditional power to determine liability before trial and put expert 
testimony to the test.  It maintains the accepted role of the tort 
system as a public safeguard in the development and market-
ing of drugs.  Finally, it treats determinations of two agencies, 
the USPTO and FDA, consistently.  A presumption of safety 
and efficacy would allow pharmaceutical regulation and phar-
maceutical litigation to work in harmony to promote the safe 
and efficient development and marketing of pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
                                                          
207 See supra Part IV.A. 
